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This paper presents a matching model with adverse selection to explain a link 
between employment legislation and the probability of switching from inactivity 
or unemployment to employment. In the countries with strict employment 
protection legislation firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker, so they 
prefer to hire out of a pool of the employed rather than out of a pool of the 
unemployed, who are more likely to be “lemons”. Based on Slovene Labor Force 
Survey data for the 1997-2002 period we find that high dismissal costs created 
mostly by the adverse selection model and rigid legislation introduce certain 
distortions on the labor market that are not similar for all groups of potential 
or current employees. The highest probability of switching from unemployment 
or inactivity to employment or from one employer to another are detected in 
the case of prime age population (20-29 years old) while in 2002, the probability 
of switching increased substantially for individuals with tertiary education. The 
young who were already married at the time of the survey have a substantially 
lower probability of improving their labor market status. We can also detect self-
discrimination of the unemployed receiving unemployment benefits. 
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1 Introduction1
Why some countries grow more than others is one of the most important questions 
in economics. Several studies show that countries with better regulations grow 
faster. Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that institutions 
are a major determinant of wealth and long-term growth. Countries with better 
developed political and economic institutions developed faster in the past and 
are richer compared to the countries whose institutions are not so well developed 
(Djankov et al., 2006). Numerous negative effects of rigid labor market regulation, 
which is characterized by difficulties in the hiring and firing of workers, as well as 
working time regulation and high costs associated with these factors have led to 
intense debates over the labor market reform in numerous European economies.2 
However, reforms of the labor market regulation can be hard to implement. 
Trade unions often fiercely defend their adopted rights due to potential negative 
short-term consequences for some groups in the labor market and fear of a loss 
of social security. In Germany, where policy makers adopted a gradual approach 
to labor market reforms, changes in the unemployment benefits system were 
debated for 11 years. In 2007, a number of macroeconomic analysts from the 
OECD and IMF attribute a recent economic upswing of German economy to 
some crucial reforms on the labor market that were implemented in 2004. The 
Dutch government reached an agreement on reforms with unions and business 
organizations in 1982 after negotiations had stalled for 9 years.3 The situation 
in developing countries is even more complicated. Opponents of reform argue 
1 I would like to thank an anonymous referee and participants of the “Youth Unemployment and the Problem 
of their Employability” seminar, held on November 24, 2005 at the Institute of Economics, Zagreb for useful 
comments and suggestions. This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a 
program of the Global Development Network. Additional funds for grantees in the Balkan countries have been 
provided by the Austrian Government through WIIW, Vienna. All the opinions expressed here are those of the 
author and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI, WIIW, or the GDN.
2 Inflexible labor markets thus stifle new job creation but even more importantly, they also push workers into the 
informal sector. According to World Bank surveys, three quarters of informal workers are women. They receive 
no social security benefits, no sick leave or pensions. If abused by their employer, they have no recourse to courts. 
Far from protecting the vulnerable, rigid employment regulation excludes them from the market. (World Bank, 
2006).
3 Rigid regulations in European countries have a significant impact on their economies’ adjustment to 
external shocks. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) argue that differences between different inflows and outflows to 
unemployment but similar employment-to-employment flows between Europe and North America arise due to 
labor market institutions that increase the costs of adverse selections.
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that because such countries lack social safety nets, they need more rigid rules on 
hiring and firing. Obviously, there are some tradeoffs. Rich countries can afford 
to finance more generous social security systems while poor countries may need 
to rely more on employment regulation. As countries develop, they can move 
to a more flexible employment regulation and more generous social security. In 
some countries (such as in Latin America’s Argentina and Brazil) we can observe 
that rigid labor legislation is in place together with high social security taxes that 
are higher than in Denmark or the Netherlands. 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debates about direct and indirect 
implications of rigid labor market legislation by identifying the most vulnerable 
groups of people affected by inefficient legislation. It studies the magnitude of 
flows between different labor market statuses (unemployment to employment, 
inactivity to employment) and flows within the group of employed job seekers, 
linking them to labor market institutions’ development in one of the most 
developed transition economies, namely Slovenia. The paper presents a model of 
adverse selection, in which hiring and firing costs (as the implicit value of rigid 
labor market legislation) reduce the hiring of both unemployed and employed 
job seekers, but where the hiring of the former is more sensitive to increases in 
turnover costs than that of the latter. The matching model with adverse selection 
shows that being exposed to unemployment stigmatizes workers because, in the 
absence of other signals, firms infer that unemployed workers are of poorer 
quality. High ability workers generate higher profits for the firm than low 
ability workers. Consequently, when the firm faces a negative shock, the latter 
are more likely to be dismissed than the former. The market therefore infers 
that the average quality of the unemployed is lower than the average quality 
of employed workers and, at the time of hiring, firms prefer to hire out of a 
pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed. 
If hiring and firing costs are high (option value effect), the costs of a firm that 
regrets its hiring choice because the worker quality turns out to be too low will 
be very high. Therefore, discrimination against unemployed job seekers is likely 
to increase as turnover costs rise. 
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The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
and estimating equation. Section 3 discusses the evolution of labor market 
institutions in Slovenia during transition. Section 4 gives a data description and 
definitions of variables while Section 5 discusses the results, followed by some 
concluding remarks. 
2 Theoretical Framework
Employment regulations are motivated by an assumption that free labor markets 
are imperfect and might cause a creation of rents in the employment relationship. 
In order to extract these rents employers are motivated to abuse workers, leading 
to both unfairness and inefficiency in the labor market (Stigler, 1971; Becker and 
Mulligan, 2003). In response to the perceived unfairness and inefficiency of the 
free market employment relationship, nearly every state intervenes to protect the 
workers in this relationship. The regulations, dealing with the issues that range 
from a mandatory minimum wage to premiums for overtime work and from 
grounds for dismissal to severance pay, have been introduced to remedy at least 
the most apparent market failures. These range from the inability to diversify 
the risk of unemployment to discrimination based on gender, race or age. Social 
security regulation was created to protect against the risk of unemployment or 
sickness and, through pensions, against the risk of poverty in old age while a 
regulatory framework was created to protect against discrimination. 
But despite the obvious benefits of such an intervention of the state in the 
labor market, there are also several drawbacks to it and the intervention 
itself, although aimed well, might actually cause the exact opposite effect of 
that desired. Several negative side effects of well-intentioned labor regulation 
have been identified, from less intense job creation to even more obvious 
discrimination. First, with rigid regulation employers choose conservatively. 
Some groups of workers benefit from rigid regulation; data show that it is 
mostly men with several years of working experience (Botero et al., 2004). Young 
workers, female workers and low-skilled workers, on the other hand, often lose 
out, being denied job opportunities. Rigid employment regulations often end 
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up protecting the existing jobs at the expense of workers in general and do 
not help in the process of job creation or toward reducing unemployment. 
Second, high severance payments are usually adopted with a view to reducing 
the risk of unemployment but, again, the beneficiaries are people who already 
have jobs. Meanwhile, the high cost forces employers to cut back on new hiring. 
As a result, very few new jobs are created. Far from diversifying risks and being 
beneficial to the economy at large, such policies reduce the odds of finding a 
job and decrease the dynamics in the economy. This is especially problematic 
in the globalization era. Namely, Bolaky and Freund (2004) report that flexible 
employment regulation also increases the benefits of trade liberalization. As the 
economy opens, competition from the now cheaper imports drives jobs away 
from less productive to more productive ones, expanding the economy. But 
this happens only if workers have the ability to move. Where barriers to hiring 
and firing are high, labor stays in unproductive sectors. This results in less job 
creation and a loss of competitiveness.
The model I present in the paper is based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
and upgraded by Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) where, on the one hand, the latter 
have simplified some aspects to preserve the analytical tractability and, on the 
other hand, they have introduced dismissal costs and imperfect observability of 
worker quality in order to capture the phenomena discussed in the introduction. 
In the asymmetric information model firms use discretion in terms of whom 
to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than 
high quality workers. Therefore, the proportion of low quality workers is greater 
among the unemployed than among the employed, and prospective employers 
know it.
The total labor force is normalized to one and split between two types of workers: 
“good” and “bad”. The proportion of workers who are “good” is denoted by z. 
Prior to hiring, firms do not observe the quality of applicants, nor do they 
observe their past labor history. The only thing they observe is whether the 
applicant is currently employed or not. Immediately after hiring, however, firms 
observe the productivity of a worker as being either “high” or “low”. Workers 
are matched to firms and together they produce output. This matching process 
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takes time. A job seeker meets a vacant job with some probability while a position 
meets a worker with probability. Firms freely enter the market by creating vacant 
positions. There is a fixed setup cost of creating a position equal to C. Because 
of free entry, the value of an empty position must always be equal to C in 
equilibrium. Once a position is filled, production takes place. Production takes 
place until either the firm decides to close the position or the worker quits 
voluntarily. When hit by a shock, firms may decide to fire the worker, in which 
case they have to pay a tax F. This tax is dissipated, i.e. paid to a third party. 
When a firm decides to fire, the position is closed and the firm’s value drops 
to zero. Moreover, production may also end when workers quit voluntarily. A 
fraction π of workers is constantly looking for another job. The  day they leave 
to take another job, the position becomes vacant and its value falls back to C. In 
addition, in case of voluntary quits firms do not have to pay the tax, F. 
Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) showed that bad workers are fired more often 
than good workers and, thus, the pool of the unemployed is composed of a 
disproportionate number of “lemons”. For this reason, at the time of hiring 
firms use the employment status as a signal of quality and are more reluctant 
to hire unemployed than employed job seekers. Moreover, they show that 
increases in hiring and firing costs exacerbate the discrimination against the 
unemployed, while large enough reductions of hiring and firing costs might 
eliminate discrimination against unemployed workers completely. The reason 
for this lies in the fact that if hiring and firing costs are nil, firms can always 
hire workers to sample their quality and fire them at no cost. In contrast, when 
hiring and firing costs are high, firms are reluctant to hire unemployed workers 
who are more likely to turn out to be “lemons” and, consequently, might have 
to be fired eventually when a firm is hit by a shock. However, the impact of 
hiring and firing costs on the discrimination of the unemployed clashes with 
the impact of wages on discrimination.
In order to operationalize the model, a reduced form specification is presented. 
In the discrete choice model, the dependent variable y takes the value of 1 if the 
person was successful in finding a job within a given time interval and the value 
of zero otherwise. Generally, success in finding a job depends on the contract 
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rate, on the offer rate and on the acceptance rate (which is simply equal to 1 in 
the model).4 According to the model, what generates differences in job finding 
rates between the two groups is the difference in the offer probabilities between 
the two groups. If we take J(m,η) to be the value to the firm of a job with worker-
specific productivity η and firm-specific productivity m, we might assume that 
firms extend a job offer if the expected profits (J) out of hiring an applicant are 
greater than or equal to the hiring cost, and they do not make a job offer if the 
expected profits fall below the hiring cost, or:








     
(1)
Letting EJs–C be a continuous random variable, it can be expressed as a linear 
function of a vector of explanatory variables, X, and an indicator of whether the 
job applicant is unemployed, U, and a random term, ε:
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From (1) and (2) we can derive the following:
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Thus, if ε is assumed to be normally distributed, the probability of finding a 
job is:
    )()0Pr()1Pr( UXUXy δβεδβ +Φ=≥++==       (4)
The vector of X includes individual characteristics affecting the contract rate, the 
offer rate and the acceptance rate of workers, among which are the following: 
age, education, occupation, industry, union status, tenure, gender, race, marital 
4 If a person applies for a job, he/she is always accepted. In reality there are also differences in the contract and 
acceptance rates between unemployed workers and employed job seekers that must be taken into account. In 
empirical analysis, these differences are partly controlled by a number of variables that control for the contract 
and the acceptance rate.
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status, number of children, the wage (wage in the current job for employed 
job seekers and wage in the last job for the unemployed), and other income of 
the household. In addition, the local unemployment rate and gross domestic 
product are both included because they should affect the contract rate.
The unemployment dummy is included because the model above tells us that 
employment status should affect the expected profits out of a new hire and, 
thus, the offer rate. In addition, employment status may also affect the contract 
rate if the unemployed can search more intensively for jobs than employed job 
seekers and it may affect the acceptance rate if the unemployed have different 
reservation wages from employed workers. However, as literature suggests that 
there might be other groups of workers discriminated when looking for a job, I 
also included dummies for women, married couples and young married couples. 
Due to labor force surveys in Slovenia, that do not include regions, wages or 
the number of children of individuals in the survey, I was not able to control 
either for the number of children, wages or several acceptance and contract rate 
characteristics (local unemployment rate, gross domestic product in the region, 
industry, or union status).
3 Labor Market Transition in Slovenia 
Slovenia’s transition from a communist system to a market-oriented economy 
has been based on two sets of policies. The first relates to the policies aimed 
at macroeconomic stabilization and internal and external liberalization. The 
second deals with structural and institutional reforms including, among others, 
institution-building, large-scale privatization, reform of the enterprise sector, the 
financial sector, the labor market, etc. At first glance, the results achieved by the 
Slovene economy are very good. Since 1993, Slovenia has maintained a robust 
growth rate of about 4 percent a year on average, substantially narrowing the 
income gap with the European Union (in 2006, GDP per capita amounted to 
almost 82 percent of the average EU-25). Much of this economic performance 
has come through gains in productivity as employment remained more or less 
constant during this period. Slovenia also managed to gradually bring inflation 
down to 8.6 percent already by the end of 1995. Inflation continued to ease 
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and declined significantly (to 2.8 percent in 2006) in order to accomplish the 
Maastricht criteria and enter the euro-zone in 2007 as the first country among 
all transition economies. But despite its relatively successful macroeconomic 
performance, Slovenia has significant problems in many areas such as labor 
market, pension system, bureaucracy and governance quality, which all lead to a 
continuing loss of competitive position.5  
Although Slovenia’s economy proved itself capable of a fast output turnaround, 
this has not led to significant employment growth. The labor force declined 2 
percent during the first 6 years of transition (1992-1997), while employment 
declined 5 percent although real output increased 21 percent. For the 1992-2002 
decade as a whole, employment and the labor force have remained practically 
flat, while real output increased 48 percent, reflecting significant productivity 
gains.
The unemployment rate remained relatively low and on a declining trend during 
transition mostly due to the choice of Slovenia’s privatization model, which 
maintained status quo and avoided massive layoffs during the transition period. 
Thanks to substantial state subsidies to loss-making firms in the textile, leather 
and many other industries, policy-makers avoided social tensions. From 1993 to 
2002, the ILO unemployment rate fell by about one-third to 6.3 percent. Such 
unemployment levels are low in comparison with other transition economies and 
lower than those in a number of EU member states (Riboud et al., 2002). The low 
overall unemployment rate hides large regional disparities, with unemployment 
remaining highly concentrated among unskilled and older workers. Moreover, 
the average duration of unemployment has increased, suggesting that the bulk 
of unemployment is structural. As Slovenia became a full member of the EU, 
many firms in loss-making industries (generally labor intensive industries) face 
big problems how to survive without state subsidies. 
5 Tax legislation (including high personal taxes and social security payments) and labor market characteristics are 
among the most problematic areas, both according to Porter and Schwab (2006) and IMD (2006). Especially 
problematic are the firing legislation, where Slovenia ranked 102nd among 117 economies, wage rigidities 
(78th/117), problems associated with employing immigration workers (76th/117) and employment of women in 
the private sector (74th/117). Thus, labor market reform will crucially determine the future competitive position 
and growth: Slovenia has one of the strictest employment protection legislations, high taxes on wages and 
inefficient system of social assistance (unemployment benefits and social assistance).
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The bulk of adjustment occurred in the early 1990s and by 2001, when transition 
was almost over, the picture was relatively favorable. Both employment and wages 
had started to rise, unemployment was on a steady decline, with a turnaround 
occurring in 1993-1995. In 2001, total employment and labor force exceeded the 
1991 levels. But the structure of employment changed significantly. First, the 
employment shares of young and older workers declined. The share of employed 
workers who are under 30 decreased from more than 32 percent in 1990 to 25 
percent in 2001, and the share of employed workers who are over 50 decreased 
from more than 12 percent to below 10 percent in the same period (Vodopivec, 
2004). When it comes to the young, both push and pull factors were at work. On 
the one hand, young workers faced more difficulties in accessing jobs because 
of the labor market tightening; on the other hand, the returns to education 
increased dramatically, making schooling at the college level more attractive. 
Many older workers retired in the early 1990s, some under pressure and with the 
encouragement of government-sponsored early retirement programs. A trend of 
the falling share of older workers was reversed in 1998 by the pension reform, 
which introduced a gradual increase in the retirement age. 
The number of workers in the labor force fell in the early 1990s and again the 
late 1990s. Because of strong growth in the interval, however, in 2001 the labor 
force exceeded its 1991 level by 2.7 percent. Despite this growth, the labor force 
participation rate declined, reflecting strong flows of the working-age population 
into non-participation. In 2001, the labor force participation rate stood at 58 
percent, which is relatively low by international standards (2.6 percentage points 
below that of a group of six industrialized Western European countries). 
A major part of the inactive young cohort is undergoing the education process. 
The number of college students nearly tripled by 2002, which can be attributed to 
a considerable increase of returns to education for all the educational attainment 
groups. The wage premium for four-year college graduates over unskilled 
laborers (those who have not finished elementary school) doubled over a six-
year period from 1987 to 1993: from 104 percent to 208 percent (Orazem and 
Vodopivec, 1995). After 1995, the value of education for all educational groups 
remained remarkably constant, with only a modest additional increase for the 
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most highly educated in 2001. Converted to yearly rates, returns to education 
in 2001 amounted to 2 percent for those with elementary education, 3 percent 
for those with vocational education, 8 percent for those who have finished high 
school, 15 percent for those with a two-year college degree and 20 percent for 
those with a four-year college degree (Vodopivec, 2004).
The youth unemployment rate fell during the transition period to stand at only 
13.6 percent according to the latest data available for January 2005. Compared 
to other countries of the EU, this is one of the lowest rates (5.1 percentage 
points below the EU-25 average and 3.4 percentage points below the EU-15 
average). In a way this also represents a specific functioning of the Slovene labor 
market with stringent labor regulation on the one hand (difficult firing) and 
a generous system of student work that implicitly stimulates young people to 
extend their schooling period. After all, we have to stress that the ratio between 
the youth and adult unemployment is one of the highest in the EU, indicating 
an unfavorable position of young job seekers on the Slovene labor market. In 
this respect the youth unemployment rate may not be an efficient indicator of 
the youth labor market position. 
If we look at unemployment by educational attainment, we can observe a 
downward trend for those without elementary school education who were 
probably included in the non-active cohort. More than 25 percent of the 
registered jobless in 2003 had secondary education of some sort and their share 
increased slightly during the transition period. In the case of the youth cohort, 
the share of the jobless with secondary education prevails and represented more 
than 35 percent already in 2003.
All the labor market statistics are supported by objective measures of business 
regulations and their enforcement, as presented in the Doing Business database 
and some of the annual reports presented there (World Bank, 2006). The Doing 
Business labor market indicators are comparable across 175 economies. According 
to the Rigidity of Employment Index6 in 2006 that encompasses three aspects of 
6 The Rigidity of Employment Index was created by Botero et al. (2004) and is more representative than the 
Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL), calculated by the OECD.
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rigidity – difficulty of hiring, rigidity of working time and difficulty of firing, 
Slovenia ranked 146th among 175 economies, far below other Central and Eastern 
European countries. Firing costs under the Slovene labor code amounted to 10 
average monthly wages in 2006, while the average for OECD countries did not 
exceeded 8 monthly wages. Minimum wages in Slovenia were set at 48 percent 
of the average wage in 2005, making it very high by international standards 
(Domadenik et al., 2006). These international comparisons and an unfavorable 
trend for specific groups of active population clearly indicate that there are some 
significant fundamental institutional distortions that need to be resolved. Rigid 
labor market institutions led to low international competitiveness of the Slovene 
labor market and contributed significantly to low international competitiveness 
of the economy as a whole (IMD, 2006).7  
4 Description of Data and Variables 
The data used in the analysis originate from the Labor Force Surveys conducted 
in Slovenia by the Slovene Statistical Office. These surveys are representative 
of the underlying population and follow similar ILO definitions to detect 
the labor market status. The data is elicited quarterly on a sample of over 
60,000 individuals. The sub-sample consists of individuals who either changed 
their labor market status (switching from inactivity to employment or from 
unemployment to employment) or their employers (switching from employment 
to employment). Due to a specific organization of labor market survey we are 
able to trace individuals – switchers – only on the basis of consecutive years. 
Therefore, we have 1089 switchers in 1997, 1124 in 1998, 1199 in 1999, 767 in 
2000, 803 in 2001 and 815 in 2002.8
7 This impression of rigidity is also confirmed by recent studies of the labor demand. Domadenik et al. (2003) 
estimated the labor demand elasticity with respect to wages and output by using company level data for 1996-
1998 and found that it is extremely low, much lower than that estimated in similar studies for Hungary and 
the Czech Republic. Whether greater labor market rigidity would be better to deal with unemployment in the 
long-run as well is the issue that deserves careful consideration.
8 I am grateful to the referee for pointing to a declining number of switchers during the period under study. This 
is probably another consequence of stricter labor market legislation that reduced labor market flows significantly. 
In the period between 1997 and 2002, the number of switchers shrank 20 percent.
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The estimates are based on the fourth quarter of yearly data in the period of 
1997-2002. These years are interesting as the earliest year spots transitional labor 
markets in the middle of the decade when transition was still under discussion, 
while the latest year is representative of a mature phase of economic transition. 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for individuals included in the 
Slovene Labor Force study in 1997 and 2002. In the four surveys carried out 
in Slovenia in 2002, 66,143 individuals were interviewed, of whom 52.2 percent 
were women. In the whole sample almost 56 percent of individuals were 
participating in the labor market, while almost 14 percent were in education. 
Some 1.3 percent of the sampled population were self-employed, 8.3 percent 
were unemployed, while the rest were employed on a permanent (40.6) or 
temporary (4.8) basis. Women had a higher non-participation rate than men, 
with fewer women permanently employed or self-employed. About 0.4 percent 
of the sample consists of foreign nationals. If we group the respondents by 
labor market status and age, we find out that young adults (20-24) are the age 
group exhibiting the highest unemployment to the population ratio of almost 
twice the total sample average. This is essentially due to the typically very high 
inactivity rate of young teenagers (15-19), which stands at over 90 percent in 
the Slovenian case as a consequence of the high level of education attainment. 
The unemployment rate of young teenagers is around 61.1 percent, more than 
double than that of young adults (20-24) and about 4 times higher than that 
recorded for the average sample. This group is the most likely to enter long-term 
unemployment. While the unemployment rate of young adults is half that of 
young teenagers, it is numerically conspicuous. The unemployment rate declines 
gently with age up to the over 55, when it rises again to 22.7 percent, perhaps 
a heritage of the structural change brought on by economic transition during 
the 1990s. 
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Table 1  Sample Population (15-64) by Gender, Citizenship and Labor Market        
            Status (in %)
Men Women TOTAL
1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
Students 12.36 13.91 11.74 13.68 12.03 13.79
Other inactive 24.97 25.74 37.04 36.25 31.24 31.22
Unemployed 10.08 8.68 8.67 7.94 9.35 8.29
Permanently employed 43.28 44.81 36.12 36.74 39.56 40.6
Temporarily employed 4.71 4.82 4.60 4.75 4.65 4.78
Self-employed 4.61 2.05 1.83 0.65 3.16 1.32
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on LFS data.
About 10 percent of the employees are employed on a temporary basis, which 
is quite high compared to the EU average of 13.7 in 1998. Comparing labor 
market statuses by level of education attained we see that the highest non-
participation rate is that of individuals with no education (without any or 
with incomplete compulsory education) or with compulsory education only. 
Similarly, the unemployment rate is the highest for those two groups and it falls 
when moving to groups of individuals with higher education.9 A much lower 
than average unemployment rate is found among persons holding a bachelor 
or a university degree, suggesting that education is an important variable in 
predicting the probability of being active or employed in the labor market. 
Research on the labor market participation of people follows the assumption 
that their labor market status is mutually exclusive. According to their answers 
to similar questions in the surveys, respondents have been grouped into one of 
three homogeneous statuses: 
Inactivity•	 , including those still undergoing compulsory schooling, 
vocational schooling, apprenticeship, academic or university education 
as well as those holding domestic unpaid jobs, being on maternity leave, 
9 Interestingly, the only exemption is the group with a four-year bachelor degree, where the unemployment is 
higher than in the group with a three-year bachelor degree. One possible reason lies in the fact that this academic 
qualification was introduced in the education system recently (the first graduates entered the labor market in 
2000) and hence, the group consists mostly of first-time job seekers.
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undergoing military service or involved in other activities;
Unemployment•	 , including those who are jobless, but actively seeking a 
job; 
Employment•	 , including those holding permanent or temporary paid jobs 
or the self-employed.
The switchers are identified as the individuals within a group of the employed who 
successfully or unsuccessfully switched between different labor market statuses 
in a given year (inactivity to employment, unemployment to employment) or 
moved successfully from one employer to another. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to detect the individuals who had the intention to move but failed to do so for 
various reasons. From the sample of individuals older than 15 but younger than 
65, I eliminated students, retired individuals10 and workers who are employed 
in agriculture. 
If we compare the sub-sample of switchers to the complete labor force survey 
sample for year 200211, we can observe some differences. Among all switchers, 69 
percent had secondary and 20 percent tertiary education while the representation 
of individuals with such an education level in the full sample is 21 percentage 
points lower. Obviously, prime age (age 20-29) single men are more likely to 
belong to the group of actual or potential switchers.
5 Results
Based on Equation 4 that represents the core of the estimating equation, I 
ran probit in order to predict the probability that an individual would switch 
his/her labor market status based on individual characteristics. The summary 
statistics of those characteristics are presented in Table 2. Unfortunately, due 
to data limitations, we can not check for firm level characteristics. The control 
group of people is represented by single inactive women who attained primary 
10 Due to unfavorable legislation retired people are not motivated to gain other employment once they receive 
their full pension.
11 Differences are very similar from one year to another. Other tables can be obtained from the author upon 
request.
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education and are more than 30 but less than 40 years. Based on the yearly 
estimations that are presented in Table 3, we can see that the level of attained 
education did not affect the individual probability of switching different labor 
market statuses (inactivity or unemployment) to employment or from one 
type of employment to another. However, in 2002, individuals with a higher 
education level were more likely to switch into employment, indicating that 
education gained a signaling effect and people with higher education were more 
likely to be employed than people with lower educational attainment. Also, 
young people were more likely to switch their labor market status than their 
older counterparts. But if we control whether they are married or not their 
probability of switching decreases significantly and becomes negative, although 
insignificant. Obviously, “being married” as an individual characteristic in the 
case of older counterparts does not play a significant role anymore, indicating 
that marriage in itself is not treated as a negative factor. 
Table 2  Proportion of Particular Groups in Switchers and Sample Population
            in 2002  (in %)
VARIABLES Switchers Full sample
Individuals with primary education 9.44 25.27
Individuals with secondary education 69.44 56.93
Individuals with tertiary  education 20.36 12.89
Individuals older than 15 but younger than 19 4.90 7.97
Individuals older than 20 but younger than 29 54.96 19.49
Individuals older than 30 but younger than 39 19.50 14.05
Individuals older than 40 but younger than 65 18.15 56.74




Young married individuals 8.22 3.04
Number of observations 815 17833
Source: Author’s calculations based on LFS data.
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Rather, it is related to higher costs that employers have if they employ parents 
with young children.12 Results also show that the least motivated group of 
switchers might be that of unemployed people who receive unemployment 
benefits. Obviously, the government’s social benefit system acts in a rather 
perverted fashion. Instead of helping people in their difficulties over a short 
period without a regular income, state unemployment benefits motivate them to 
remain unemployed as long as possible.13 If they lose benefits, their probability 




Employment policies and labor market institutions are often targeted at 
some specific demographic groups, particularly those facing more difficulties 
in finding jobs (youth, female, long-term unemployed). However, as many 
empirical studies confirm, the effect of such policies on different population 
groups can be very different (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Broadly speaking, there 
are two streams in the empirical literature discussing the labor market effects of 
institutions. First, there are cross-country studies that use some quantitative and 
qualitative indicators representing those institutions to explain international 
differences in labor market outcomes (such as unemployment and employment 
rates). The second stream of literature looks at the specific country episodes 
and tries to evaluate the impact of reforms (like Kugler et al. (2003) did for 
12 With one of the most generous system fostering motherhood in the world (100 percent income coverage, 
possibility of extending maternity leave up to three years, etc.) Slovenia creates an environment that works 
implicitly against those who would like to set up a family. In order to minimize the costs associated with labor, 
employers are reluctant to hire young married couples as they do not want to cover all the benefits that young 
parents are entitled to. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze potentially discriminatory actions 
of employers against the individuals who should take care of younger children.
13 As described by Vodopivec (2004), Slovenia had one of the most generous passive labor market policies among 
all transition countries in that period. Although the system has been reformed to a degree, it is very comparable 
to the system adopted by developed EU countries. Unemployed workers in Slovenia may apply for unemployment 
benefits that range from 3 months’ pay for workers with few years of service to 24 months for workers with 
longer service and older workers. The replacement rate in the period under study (1997-2002) was 70 percent 
in the first three months and dropped to 60 percent thereafter. In most other transition countries, the potential 
duration of eligibility is between 6 and 12 months. In the 1990s, the generosity of unemployment benefits index 
(defined as a product of the replacement rate and the share of compensated unemployed among all unemployed) 
standing at 21.8 in Slovenia was the highest among all transition countries, or well above the CEEC average 
of 12.7 (Vodopivec, 2004).
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Spain, Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France or Galiani and Hopenhayn 
(2003) for Argentina). This paper contributes to the second stream of literature 
by analyzing a specific group of people that are discriminated against most 
probably due to rigid employment regulation in Slovenia. This is done in a 
sound analytical framework where employment regulation is captured in the 
model of adverse selection and incomplete information.
The paper finds out that high dismissal costs, created mostly by the adverse 
selection model and rigid legislation, introduce certain distortions on the labor 
market that are not similar for all the groups of potential or current employees. 
The highest probability of switching from unemployment or inactivity to 
employment or from one employer to another is detected among prime age 
population (20-29 years old) while in 2002, the probability of switching increases 
substantially for individuals with tertiary education. Young people who were 
already married at the time of the survey have a substantially lower probability 
of improving their labor market status. 
The second important conclusion is that there is also evidence of self-
discrimination by the unemployed who are entitled to participate in 
unemployment benefits schemes. Such people are obviously not motivated to 
look actively for a job. Slovenia will have to remodel financial incentives to get 
the unemployed back to work (Boone and van Ours, 2006). Several studies show 
that a deterioration of the embodied human capital is positively linked with the 
spell of unemployment. An inefficient benefits system ruins the human capital 
implicitly and reduces the probability of finding employment of such people 
in the long-run.
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